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8.1 Introduction 
What do people use as money? In studying national economies we usually 
do not worry about this question very much, assuming that governments are 
able to create fiat monies and enforce their acceptance. There are some prob- 
lems, such as the role of  inside monies and near monies,  and the cases of 
“dollarization”  (as  in  Israel)  where  the  national  currency  is  partly  sup- 
planted by some other currency. But these problems are the exception rather 
than the rule, and theorists are generally comfortable with the idea of assum- 
ing a demand  for M/P without having to explain  why  it is these pieces of 
paper, rather than something else, which appear in the numerator. 
When we study the  international  economy, however, we can no  longer 
avoid the question. International  economic  activity,  like domestic  activity, 
requires the use of money, and the same forces which  lead to convergence 
on a single domestic money lead the world to converge on a limited number 
of  international  monies.  Before  World  War  I, the  pound  sterling  was  the 
international currency; in the interwar period the dollar and the pound shared 
the role; in the rjretton Woods era the dollar was dominant.  But there is no 
world  government  to enforce the role of  international  monies.  The preem- 
inence of  sterling and its displacement  by the dollar were largely the result 
of  “invisible  hand”  processes, ratified  more than  guided  by  international 
agreements.  The future  of  the  United  States monetary  system is  largely  a 
political  question;  the  future  international  role  of  the  dollar  is  largely  an 
economic one. 
Yet it is a question  which,  though central to international  monetary dis- 
cussion in the 1960s and still a major policy issue, has virtually disappeared 
from the research  agenda. The reason  for this neglect lies in the change in 
the field of international monetary economics.  Traditionally dominated by a 
I  would like to  thank Peter Kenen for helpful suggestions. 
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historical and  institutional approach,  international monetary  economics in 
the  1970s essentially became a branch  of  macroeconomics. This meant a 
drastic change in style.  Formal models replaced  well-written essays; brief 
journal articles replaced books. Adjustment, Confidence, Liquidity became 
pfp = h(y -  J),  i = i*  + r,  AR = AM - a0.  And  the change in style 
meant a change in  substance. What we  know  how  to model formally are 
frictionless markets,  where  transactions are costless and  agents make full 
use of  the information available. The microeconomics of  money, however, 
whether domestic or international, is fundamentally about frictions. Thus the 
explosion of  theory in  international economics in the  1970s was concerned 
with macroeconomic issues and ignored the traditional issues regarding the 
role of the dollar. 
The problem is that the fact that an  issue is hard to model rigorously is 
no guarantee that  the  issue is  unimportant. Fortunately, even  a less than 
fully worked out model can be useful, if  one does not  demand too much of 
it.  Over the  years,  a number of  economists, especially Swoboda (1969), 
Cohen (1971), McKinnon (1979), and Kindleberger (1981), have developed 
what amounts to a theory of international money. This theory is not embed- 
ded  in formal models  in  the way  that,  say, the  monetary approach to the 
balance of payments is; but it is tight enough to be informative. The purpose 
of  this paper is to provide a unified exposition of  this theory and to apply it 
to the history and the future of the role of the dollar. 
The basic concepts of  this theory are drawn from the (equaiiy informal) 
theory of money in a closed economy. Frictions-costs  of transacting, costs 
of  calculation-cause  agents to use national monies as international media 
of exchange, units of account, stores of value; economies of scale lead them 
to concentrate on only a few-often  only one-currency  for these purposes. 
The differences between the theory of  international money and the ordinary 
theory of money arise from two facts. First, we are not dealing with a choice 
among  commodities but  with  a choice among  monies,  demanded  not  for 
their  intrinsic usefulness but  because  of  their privileged  role  in  domestic 
transactions.  Second,  part  of  the  international role  of  the  dollar  reflects 
choices  made  by  official  bodies,  the  central  banks,  rather  than  private 
agents. A crucial question is, How closely linked are the official and private 
roles? Would replacing the dollar with  some other reserve asset reduce its 
role  in  private transactions? Conversely, can central banks  be  induced  to 
hold a reserve asset which is not a “live”  international money? 
This paper is in five sections. Section 8.2  reviews the basic roles of inter- 
national money and provides an overview of the argument. Section 8.3 ex- 
amines the role of the dollar as a medium of exchange; it presents a simple 
model  of  convergence on  a limited number of  international media of  ex- 
change and discusses the ways in  which  transitions from one vehicle cur- 
rency to another might happen. Section 8.4 turns to the unit-of-account role. 
It tries to combine arguments by  several authors to provide a stylized ac- 263  The International Role of  the Dollar 
count of  the choice of invoice currency in private transactions. Section 8.5 
then reviews the store-of-value role, presenting evidence on and an interpre- 
tation of  recent trends toward diversification in the currency denominations 
of reserve holdings, Euro-currency holdings, and international lending. 
The final section of  the paper takes a tentative look forward. It reviews 
the forces leading to a reduction in the dominance of  the dollar; a compari- 
son  is made between  the position of  the dollar today  and the  position  of 
sterling in the  1910s and  1920s. 1 argue that  a  “collapse”  of  the dollar’s 
role is possible, though it  is by  no means necessary, and I discuss briefly 
what such a collapse might involve. 
8.2  The Six Roles of the Dollar 
Money,  the classical economists argued,  serves three functions:  it is  a 
medium of  exchange, a unit of  account, and a store of value. International 
money does the same: it is used to settle international payments, it is used 
to fix prices,  it  is held as a liquid asset for international transactions.  An 
added dimension is provided by the distinction between private behavior and 
the decisions of central banks (although the central banks of  small countries 
may behave more like private agents than like Group of  Ten monetary au- 
thorities). Thus there are six roles of the dollar, presented schematically in 
table 8.1 (closely based on Cohen 1971). The dollar is used as a medium of 
exchange in private transactions, or “vehicle,”  and is also bought and sold 
by  central banks,  thus  making  it an  “intervention”  currency.  Trade con- 
tracts are sometimes denominated in dollars,  making  it an  “invoice”  cur- 
rency, and the par values for exchange rates are sometimes stated in terms 
of the dollar, which makes it serve as a “peg.” Finally, private agents hold 
liquid dollar-denominated assets-the  “banking”  role-and  central banks 
hold the dollar as a reserve. 
In principle and to some extent in practice these roles are separable. The 
separation of  roles can be either horizontal or vertical. Thus under the gold 
standard the official roles were filled by gold, yet sterling played the private 
roles.  In the European snake in the mid-1970s the currencies were pegged 
Table 8.1  Roles of an International Currency 
Private  Official 
~ 
Medium of  exchange 
Unit of account 







I. Kindleberger (1981) treats the denomination of loans in dollars as a seventh role, that of 
“standard  of deferred repayment.” I prefer to regard this as a particular case of the “invoice” 
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to one another, yet the dollar was  used  as a reserve and  intervention  cur- 
rency. One can even separate medium of exchange and unit of account-the 
famous  example is those  small Persian  Gulf  nations  which  until  1974 set 
their oil prices in dollars but required payment in sterling. But the roles are 
not  independent.  In  ways which  I  hope will  become clearer,  the more the 
dollar is used in one role, the more incentive there is to use it in the others. 
Let us briefly  review  the actual extent to which  the dollar plays the dif- 
ferent roles: 
1. Vehicle. It is important to distinguish three types of transaction here. 
First is settlement between nonbank firms, which is closely tied to invoicing; 
as discussed  below, the  dollar plays  a special but not exclusive role here. 
Second  is  the  “retail”  foreign  exchange  market  in  which  firms deal  with 
banks; here the dollar plays no special role; a Swedish bank will sell, say, 
kronor for pesetas and vice versa. Finally there is the interbank market: here 
the dollar is the medium of exchange. “Virtually  all interbank transactions, 
by market participants here and abroad, involve a purchase or sale of dollars 
for a foreign currency. This  is true even if  a bank’s aim is to buy German 
marks for sterling”  (Kubarych  1978, p. 18). 
2. Intervention. Central  banks  usually  intervene  in  the  existing  private 
interbank  market; thus the dollar  is the  intervention  currency.  This  is true 
even for some of the interventions which maintain  parities  within the Euro- 
pean Monetary System. 
3. Invoice.  Data  on this  are  not  as  good  as we  might  like,  but  a  few 
generalizations  seem  possible.  In  manufactured  goods  trade  between  any 
two countries, there is a preference for invoicing in exporter’s currency,  but 
also a preference for invoicing in the currency of the larger country. This in 
itself gives the  United States, as the world’s  largest economy, a dispropor- 
tionate share of the invoicing.  In addition,  much raw  materials  trade,  even 
if  it does not involve the United States, is also invoiced in dollars. In finan- 
cial transactions,  the dollar is the dominant currency  for international bor- 
rowing and lending, though this dominance is not complete. 
4. Peg. This is the best-known  aspect of the  story.  In  1970 most of the 
world was pegged to the dollar; now only a limited number of smaller coun- 
tries still are. This does not, however, represent the rise of a rival currency, 
but the abandonment of fixed rates altogether. 
5. Bunking. Dollars  in  New  York  and Eurodollars  in London constitute 
the  main  liquid  international asset, although  there  has been some diversifi- 
cation into other currencies,  especially Deutsche marks. 
6. Reserve. The dollar accounts  for the  bulk  of  nongold  reserves,  with 
some accounting complications introduced recently  by the EMS. As will be 
discussed further below, there is again some trend toward diversification. 
It  is  clear  from  this  brief  description  that  the  dollar  is  an  international 
money, though its moneyness is less than it might be, less than it was eleven 
years ago, and less than  that of  sterling in  1913. The natural  questions are 265  The International Role of the Dollar 
how  this position  is likely to change and what difference it makes.  To an- 
swer these-as  best we can, for the answers will be based on loose theory 
and casual empirics-we  need to examine the forces which make the dollar 
an international money. 
8.3 The Dollar as an International Medium of Exchange 
8.3.1 Economies of Scale and Indirect Exchange 
The role of the dollar as a vehicle currency can be attributed to economies 
of scale in foreign exchange markets, which in turn arise from the lumpiness 
of transactions.  “Since the dollar is the main currency for international trade 
and investment the dollar market for each currency is much more active than 
between any pair of  foreign currencies.  By going through the dollar, large 
amounts can be traded more easily”  (Kubarych  1978, p.  18). 
The nature of the economies of scale can be illustrated  if  we ignore the 
distinction  between  retail  and  interbank  markets  and  simply think  of  firms 
offering  to  buy  and  sell  foreign  exchange. Suppose  that  at  the  going  ex- 
change rate the total demand and supply for foreign exchange in some mar- 
ket are equal over the course of a year, but that offers to exchange curren- 
cies in either direction are of finite size and arrive at random times. Then a 
firm offering to exchange currencies may  find a complementary  offer wait- 
ing for it in the marketplace,  but it may have to wait for one to arrive, and 
may  have to wait until  earlier offers are consummated.  Thus there will on 
average be some delay before a transaction can be completed.  Now suppose 
the flow through  the market  were to double.  It is obvious that the average 
waiting time would fall. It is easier to find a match in a thick market than a 
thin one.= 
Adding  market-making  banks, who hold  currency  stocks, will not much 
alter this picture.  Firms may  no longer have to wait, but the  law  of  large 
numbers  will  imply  that  the  trade-off  between  the  size of  currency  stocks 
and the probability of a stockout will improve as the market gets larger. So 
bid-ask  spreads will be lower in larger markets. 
To go from economies of scale in the exchange markets to the emergence 
of  a vehicle currency, it is useful to make a distinction between what I have 
called  (Krugman  1980) the srrucrure of  payments and  the structure  of  ex- 
change. By the structure of payments  we will mean the matrix  of final de- 
mands  for foreign  exchange for the purposes  of  trade  and  investment.  By 
the  structure  of  exchange we  will  mean  the  matrix  of  actual  foreign  ex- 
change transactions.  The distinction  between  these  may  be  illustrated  by 
considering,  say, trade and investment flows between Ecuador and the Neth- 
2.  An  ingenious  and  suggestive  model  along these  lines of  the emergence  of  a domestic 
medium of  exchange is Jones (1976). 266  Paul Krugman 
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Fig. 8.1  The  structure of  payments (a);  the  structure of  exchange: direct 
exchange (b);  the structure of  exchange: indirect exchange (c). 
erlands.  These  will  appear as positive  entries in  the  Ecuador-Netherlands 
and Netherland-Ecuador  boxes  of  the structure of payments; but  there will 
be a zero in the guilder-sucre box of the structure of exchange, because the 
actual transactions  will take place in the dollar-guilder and dollar-sucre mar- 
kets.  To a first approximation, we can regard  the structure of payments  as 
independent  of  the choice of  medium of exchange, determined  by  “funda- 
mental”  trade  and investment  motives.  The question  then becomes  one of 
determining the structure of exchange given these fundamentals. 
Consider first a world of three countries, A, B, and C. They have national 
currencies, the a,  the p, and the y. In figure 8.1~  is illustrated the structure 
of payments in this world: PAB,  Psc, PCA  are the final demands for foreign 
exchange flows, measured in the same (arbitrary) units; they are assumed to 
be bilaterally balan~ed.~ 
How will  these payments be carried out? One possibility,  illustrated  in 
figure 8.lb,  is that payments will take place directly, with all three pairs of 
3. If  the  structure of payments is not bilaterally balanced,  the  model becomes much more 
complicated. It becomes possible  that  some but not all payments are  made indirectly through 
the  vehicle  currency; this  “partial  indirect exchange”  will  be  associated  with  a  systematic 
difference between the direct exchange rate and the cross rate. For an unfortunately unreadable 
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currencies  actively  traded.  If  so, the  volume  of  exchange  transactions  in 
each market will equal the final payments. But suppose that A is much more 
important a trading and investment partner of B and C than either is of  the 
other; that is, PAB, PCA >> PBC. Then it will be cheaper to trade  p’s and 
y’s indirectly,  through the vehicle of  the a,  and the  structure of  exchange 
will collapse to that  illustrated in  figure 8.lc, where there  is no active Py 
market.  An  important  point  to note  is that  this  channeling  of  transactions 
between  B  and  C  through  A’s  currency  itself  swells  the  markets  in  that 
currency, reinforcing its ad~antage.~ 
8.3.2 N-Country Complications 
When we go beyond three countries, the picture becomes somewhat more 
complicated,  though  the  principles  don’t  change.  Two  new  possibilities 
emerge: First,  that the currency of a country which  is not very dominant in 
world payments will emerge as vehicle through a process of ‘‘snowballing”; 
second, that there may emerge a multipolar world with several vehicle cur- 
rencies. 
Snowballing  may  be illustrated by  the  following example. Suppose that 
the  world  consists  of  several  large  countries,  one only slightly larger than 
the  others, and a number of  small countries.  Simple trilateral  comparisons 
would  lead  us  to  expect payments  between  large  countries  to  take  place 
through  direct exchange; yet the presence of the smaller countries can lead 
to a complete “super-monetization”  of world payments. The process would 
work  as follows:  payments  between  small  countries  will  take  place  indi- 
rectly, through the medium of  the largest country’s currency; this will swell 
these  markets,  creating  an  incentive  for other  large countries  to carry out 
their  exchanges with  the  small  countries  via  the  same medium;  this  will 
swell all of the markets in the largest country’s currency, perhaps enough to 
eliminate all direct bilateral markets. It may not be too far-fetched to suggest 
that this process explains the rise of sterling to an extraordinary position  of 
dominance at a  time when  Britain,  though  the  economic  leader,  was  far 
from having  the  sort  of  preeminence  that,  say, the  United  States  had  in 
1950. 
On  the  other hand,  a  many-country  world  can  support  several  vehicle 
currencies. Figure 8.2  illustrates a possible structure of exchange among five 
countries-A,  B, C, D, E-whose  currencies are the a,  p, y, 6, E, respec- 
tively.  Payments  between  the countries are PAB, PBc,  etc.; transactions on 
the markets are Tap,  T,,,  etc. The illustrated pattern  is one in which A and 
B are both vehicle currency countries.  There is an  “alpha area”  (A and C) 
4. Cohen (1971 p. 60)  quotes A. C. L. Day: “In general the more connexions a country has 
and the stronger they are, the more connexions she is likely to attract. This meant that because 
Britain had very extensive trading . . . connexions, sterling would be all the more useful to a 
country  which chose to  use  it; and  as more people came to  use  it,  sterling  would be all the 
more attractive as a means of international payment to everyone.” 268  Paul Krugman 
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Fig. 8.2  A bipolar structure of exchange 
in which all payments go through a’s,  and a “beta area” (B and E) in which 
payments  go through  the  p. One country,  D, is a part  of  neither  area, so 
that there is both  an active a8 and an active p8 market.  A bipolar structure 
of exchange of this type existed in the dollar-sterling system of the interwar 
period, and is a possible future. 
8.3.3 Multiple Equilibria and Changes in the Vehicle 
The model  of  vehicle  currencies  we  have  sketched  out  contains  an  ob- 
vious  possibility  for  multiple  equilibria.  If  the  choice  of  a  currency  as  a 
vehicle is a response to the relative size of the markets in it, and if a curren- 
cy’s becoming  a vehicle itself  swells those markets,  then  the choice of ve- 
hicle  may  be  self-justifying.  This  in  turn  suggests  that  once  a  country’s 
currency  gets  established  as the  international  medium  of  exchange  it  will 
continue  in that role, even if  the country loses the position  in the structure 
of payments which originally gave it that position. Thus sterling remained a 
vehicle currency long after Britain  had ceased to be number  1. 
It might be objected that a structure of exchange which does not minimize 
worldwide transaction costs offers a profit opportunity.  A bank could act as 
market maker and reap the gains. I would offer a guess here: market making 
probably  involves  a one-time  fixed  cost  in  getting  market  participants  in- 
formed and inducing them to change their behavior.  In existing markets this 
is a sunk cost, which need not be expended  again; to change the structure 
of exchange requires  a new  expenditure.  The result is that the structure of 
exchange will change only if  it  is very far from what the structure of pay- 
ments would suggest, so that the choice of  a medium of  exchange exhibits 
a good  deal  of  inertia.  On  the  other hand,  a temporary  disruption  of  the 
foreign exchange markets can shift the structure of exchange from one equi- 
librium  to  another  and  thus  have  lasting  effects.  The choice  of  a  vehicle 
currency reflects both history  and hysteresis. 269  The International Role of the Dollar 
The actual decline of sterling as a medium of  exchange,  and its replace- 
ment by  the dollar, appears  to have  taken  place  in  a sharp slump, a long 
slow slide, and a final crash. World War I exchange  restrictions disrupted 
the  sterling  system  and  led  to the  emergence  of  the  dollar, and  also  the 
French franc, as rivals; and the dollar slowly gained ground for fifty years. 
(Remarkably,  sterling  remained  the  more  important  medium  of  exchange 
during  the  interwar  period, and  may  even  still  have  been  more  important 
than the dollar in the late 1940s). Finally,  sterling vanished from the map in 
the  late  1960s and the early  1970s. The impressive fact here  is surely the 
inertia;  sterling  remained  the  first-ranked  currency  for half  a century  after 
Britain had ceased to be the first-ranked economic power.5 
8.3.4 Relationships to Other Roles of Money 
The  discussion  in  this  section  has  concentrated  on  the  medium-of-ex- 
change role of  international money in isolation. In fact, there is some inter- 
dependence among roles. The links which seem clear are these: if the dollar 
is a good  store of  value, the costs of  making markets against the dollar are 
lower, thus  encouraging  the  vehicle  role.  Conversely, the  medium-of-ex- 
change  role  encourages  both  invoicing  in  dollars  and  holding  dollars,  we 
will discuss below. 
8.4  The Dollar as an International Unit of  Account 
Most of the analytical work on the use of currencies as international units 
of  account  has  focused  on the official  role:  on the decision on whether to 
peg to another currency,  and on the choice of peg. I will not attempt to add 
to this extensive literature; in any case, hardly anyone still pegs to the dol- 
lar. Instead, this section will focus on the private use of currencies as units 
of  account. A good place to start, because there are relatively abundant data, 
is the invoicing decision. 
Even in the  1960s, trade contracts were by no means exclusively written 
in dollars.  In influential work, Grassman (1973) showed that most Swedish 
trade was  invoiced in exporting country currency.  It seems to be generally 
true that trade between  industrial countries is invoiced in either the export- 
er’s or the importer’s  currency, with  no major role for the dollar  in trade 
between third parties. 
Table 8.2 presents some comparative numbers on the share of exports and 
imports invoiced in a country’s currency and on the share of  exports to the 
United States invoiced in dollars.  The countries are ranked  in order of  the 
value  of  their  1978 exports. An  impressionistic  look at this  table suggests 
that much of the variation can be explained by three rules. First, other things 
equal the exporter’s currency is preferred.  For every country for which data 
5. This account is drawn from Yeager (1976) and Cohen (1971). 270  Paul Krugman 
Table 8.2  Invoicing of Merchandise Trade 
Share of  Domestic Currency 
Used to Invoice: 
Exports  Imports 
Share of  Exports to United States 











































Source: Page (1977), Rao and Magee (1980) 
on both are available,  a higher share of exports than  imports is invoiced  in 
domestic  currency. Second, other things  equal  the  currencies  of  large  are 
used  more  than  those  of  small  countries.  Thus Germany  has  the  highest 
proportion  of exports in domestic currency and a sizable fraction of  imports 
in  marks  as well;  the  fraction  of  exports  to the  United  States invoiced  in 
dollars is noticeably high, even for countries which mostly  invoice in home 
currency. 
The third  rule  is  that  the  yen  is  hardly  used.  As  shown  in  the  table, 
virtually  all Japanese  exports  are  invoiced  in  dollars;  it  is also true where 
data are available that the yen  is much  less used as an  invoice currency  in 
exports  to Japan  than Japan’s  size would  lead  one to expect. This may  in 
part reflect a political decision on the part  of Japan not to allow the yen to 
become an international currency. 
In additional to these generalizations,  we have one more observation: raw 
materials trade,  and with  it most of LDC exports, is generally  invoiced in 
dollars. McKinnon has proposed the terms “tradables  I” and “tradables  11” 
to describe  the relevant distinction.  Tradables  I  are differentiated manufac- 
tured products,  typically produced by oligopolists,  and normally invoiced in 
exporting  country  currency--except,  we  might  add, when  the  importer  is 
large relative to the exporter, in which case the importer’s currency is used. 
Tradables  I1 are primary  products,  sold  in  a  world  market,  and  normally 
invoiced in dollars. 
Figure  8.3 shows a stylized version  of the  facts about choice of  invoice 
currency. Four types of countries are distinguished: the United States, large 
advanced  countries, small advanced  countries,  and  LDCs.  An  arrow  indi- 271  The International Role of  the Dollar 
Advanced I; U  - - - -  - 
-  ~  U.S. dollar 
- exporter’s  currency 
...--.  - importer’s currency 
_- 
Fig. 8.3  Choice of currency in world trade 
cates the direction of  exports.6 
These, then, are our stylized facts about invoicing. What explains them? 
I would argue that they reflect essentially the cost of calculation. 
Note that  risk  sharing by  itself cannot explain the pattern of  invoicing. 
The reason is  that  firms can  always avoid  exchange risk  by  entering the 
forward market, and that the choice between invoicing in  exporter and im- 
porter currency is simply a question of deciding who does the forward con- 
tract. (Even if  no forward market exists, firms can “roll their own”  forward 
contracts by international borrowing and lending.) Admittedly, forward con- 
tracting does  involve some costs,  but  then  it  is  on  the  “frictions”  rather 
than on risk per se that we should focus. 
The simplest explanation seems to be this. To deal with contracts denom- 
inated  in  foreign  currency,  one  must  be  sophisticated about  foreign  ex- 
change-and  acquiring this sophistication has a real if hard-to-measure fixed 
cost.  In  the case of  tradables I, the exporter is typically  a firm  selling a 
differentiated product; its costs are mostly fixed in domestic currency, so its 
normal pricing strategy will be to keep the domestic currency price fixed. 
This being the case, it is natural that the firm should leave worrying about 
the exchange rate to the importer, who has to deal with exchange markets 
as a matter of course in any case. The special case where a small country 
exports to a large country then falls into place-in  small countries, everyone 
is  obliged  to  be  sophisticated about  foreign exchange; in  large  countries 
nobody wants to worry about it. 
Exporters of  tradables 11,  by  contrast, sell products whose prices depend 
6. This scheme is essentially  that offered by Magee and Rao (1980). 272  Paul Krugman 
very little on domestic factors. For them the easiest procedure-in  the sense 
that  each contract  does not  involve  a  simultaneous  speculation  on  future 
exchange  rates-is  to have  all  contracts  anywhere  in  the  world  written  in 
the same currency, for which the  international medium of exchange  is the 
most natural. 
Kindleberger  has  used  the  analogy  between  money  and  language  to ex- 
plain  the  role of  the dollar;  in this  situation  it  fits very  well.  If  I  want  to 
communicate with someone of a different nationality, one or both of us must 
invest  in learning  a second  language.  If she is from a large country  and  I 
from a small one, we will probably  use her language; if  we are both  from 
small countries, we will  both  use  some international language.  If  a Dutch 
businessman and a German businessman make an agreement, they will prob- 
ably converse in German and quote prices in  marks; if  the Dutch business- 
man  then  deals with  a  Brazilian,  the  conversation  will  more  likely  be  in 
English and the price in dollars. 
This is a very  loose argument, and we would  not  want  to lean too hard 
on it.  Nevertheless,  we will push  it just a bit further,  to suggest that inter- 
national capital markets4specially under fixed rates-resemble  tradables I1 
in that bond prices are very much internationalized. LIBOR and the Chicago 
wheat price both are watched around the world, and in both cases this makes 
it convenient to denominate  international contracts in dollars. 
Is  there  anything  in  the  unit-of-account  role  of  the  dollar  which  corre- 
sponds  to the possibility  of  multiple  equilibria  in  its  medium  of  exchange 
role? In trade among the advanced countries, the choice of a unit of amount 
seems to be determined by fundamentals; the use of the dollar is comparable 
to the use of the mark, that is, the dollar plays no more of a role than  the 
size of the United States entitles it to. Where there is an arbitrariness in the 
use of the dollar is in LDCkradables I1 trade and, perhaps,  in international 
lending.  Here there is again a situation where the dollar is used because it 
is used, and its place could be taken by the mark or the yen. 
8.5  The Dollar as an International Store of Value 
8.5.1  Sterling and the Dollar as Banking Currencies 
In  1913 working  balances  in  sterling  were  held  by  banks  and  firms  all 
around  the  world,  reflecting  in  part  the demand  for sterling created by  its 
other monetary  roles,  in  part the economies  of  scale which  made  London 
the most efficient financial center. Thus settlement of  trade contracts in ster- 
ling, servicing  of  sterling-denominated  debt,  and  interbank transactions  in 
sterling all required holding of sterling balances; the vehicle role of sterling 
made it more liquid than other currencies; and the scale of the London mar- 
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The dollar today holds a similar, but less striking, position. As we  have 
seen,  the  dollar  is  dominant  in  interbank markets,  still acounts for  most 
international lending, and plays a disproportionate though not dominant role 
in trade invoicing. Economies of  scale also play a role-but  in a more con- 
fusing way. Dollar balances can be held not only in New  York but also in 
London,  so that  the advantages of  the dollar are not  so much tied  to the 
scale of  activities in a particular geographical center as they are to the scale 
of  activities in  that currency. Nonetheless, these economies are real-imag- 
ine asking a London bank to offer a Euro-drachma account or a Euro-escudo 
account,  and  the  importance of  having at  least  some  minimum  scale be- 
comes apparent. 
As  a store of  value,  however,  the  dollar has  one  disadvantage prewar 
sterling did not have.  This is the uncertainty caused by  floating exchange 
rates.  Uncertain exchange rates push wealth holders toward diversification, 
opposing the forces encouraging convergence on a single currency. The re- 
sult has apparently been a gradual diversification away from the dollar since 
1973. The first line of table 8.3 presents some evidence from the Eurocur- 
rency markets, where a slow drift away from the dollar seems to have oc- 
curred. 
8.5.2  The Dollar as a Reserve Currency 
Probably the most important reason for holding reserves in dollars is that 
the dollar is an  intervention currency. This means that reserves initially ac- 
crue to central banks in dollars and must be converted to other currencies if 
the  central banks  want  to  diversify.  It  also means  that  reserves must  be 
converted back  to dollars to be  used  for intervention. For  large countries 
such operations carry more than a transaction cost: movements into and out 
of  nondollar currencies amount  to  intervention in  other countries’ foreign 
exchange markets which are likely to be resented (the United States is used 
to it).  Because of  this political aspect, jointly  floating European countries 
(in the snake and later in the EMS) have continued to hold reserves in  dol- 
Table 8.3  The Dollar as a Store of Value 
1970  1973  1980 
Share of dollars in  “offshore”  holdings of European banks”  77.1  70.4  69.0 
Share of  dollars in world foreign exchange reservesb  75.6  84.5  73.1 
Share of  pounds in world foreign exchange reservesb  12.6  5.9  3.0 
“International  currency” share in foreign exchange reserves‘  88.2  84.5  73.1 
“BIS Annual Report. 
?his  number includes dollars exchanged by members of the EMS for ECUs. See IMF, Annual 
Report 1981, p. 69. 
‘See  text for explanation. 274  Paul Krugman 
lars, not in each others’ currencies; and they have often maintained cross- 
parities by simultaneous buying and selling of  dollars, not by  direct swaps 
of  European currencies. 
Opposing these advantages of  the dollar is the desire of  central banks to 
diversify agains exchange risk.  As table 8.3 shows,  the  dollar’s  share of 
world foreign exchange reserves actually rose in the early 1970s, then de- 
clined. But in  a sense this is misleading as a measure of  “demonetization” 
of  reserves, because sterling was still a partial international money in 1970. 
The last line of the table adds the dollar and pound shares in 1970, but not 
afterward, to give a rough measure of  the share of  international money in 
reserves. It  suggests a continual and substantial shift on the part of  central 
banks toward less liquid but less risky portfolios. 
8.6 Prospects for the Dollar’s Role 
8.6.1  Determinants of the Dollar’s Role 
The theory of  international money sketched out in  the preceding section 
emphasized two kinds of influence on the choice of currency as international 
money and on  the importance of  its role.  First, the currency of  a country 
which is important in world markets will be a better candidate for an  inter- 
national money than that of a smaller country. Second, the use of a currency 
as an international money itself reinforces that currency’s usefulness, so that 
there is an element of circular causation. This circularity was clearest in the 
case of  choice of  a medium of  exchange, where a given structure of  pay- 
ments-a  type of  market  fundamentals-might  be  consistent with  several 
different structures of exchange, because of the self-justifying effect of mak- 
ing a currency serve as vehicle. 
It is this circularity which raises the most worries about the future pros- 
pects of  the dollar. The troublesome possibilities are either that the dollar’s 
fundamental advantages will drop to some critical point, leading to an abrupt 
unraveling of  its international role, or that a temporary disruption of  world 
financial markets will permanently impair the dollar’s usefulness. These are 
not purely academic speculations, since they have precedent  in the history 
of  sterling’s decline.  The  disruption of  World  War  I  led  to  a permanent 
reduction  in sterling’s role,  while the  gradual relative decline of  Britain’s 
importance in the world was  reflected not in  a smooth decline in sterling’s 
role but in surprising persistence followed by  abrupt collapse. 
These possibilities are illustrated in figure 8.4. We assume that it is pos- 
sible to define some index of the use of  the dollar as international money 
(though we  have emphasized that the different roles are at least partly sep- 
arable). The desired use of the dollar as international money will then be an 
increasing function of  the actual use,  as  illustrated by  the curve UU. The 
position of this schedule depends on fundamentals, such as the relative size 275  The International Role of  the Dollar 
Desired  use  of 
the  dollar 
Actual use of 
the  dollar 
Fig. 8.4  Possibilities for a collapse of the dollar’s role 
of the United States economy and the openness and efficiency of  its capital 
markets,  as well as the stability of exchange rates and thus the strength of 
the incentives for diversification. Given these fundamentals,  however, there 
may be several equilibria, as illustrated. Even without a formal specification 
of dynamics, it seems clear that X  and 2 will be the locally stable equilibria 
here; Z  might correspond to the current state of dollar standard with diver- 
sification, X to a multipolar world where the mark and yen serve as regional 
international currencies. 
Suppose that  the  fundamental  strength  of  the  dollar  were  gradually  to 
weaken (as it surely has). Then UU would shift downward. Initially the role 
of  the  dollar would  also  gradually  decline, from Z  to Z’. At  that  point, 
however,  a critical level would have been reached;  a small further decline 
in the fundamentals would produce an unraveling of the dollar’s role. As it 
was used less, the desired use would fall, and the role of  the dollar would 
decline to X’ even without any further weakening in the fundamentals. 
Alternatively,  a temporary disruption of the system could shift the world 
from one equilibrium  to another.  It is depressingly easy to imagine scena- 
rios; for example, a war scare in Europe.  This could lead  to capital  flight 
and the imposition of  exchange controls.  If  the controls lasted long enough 
they  could break the habit of doing business  in dollars, so that when  they 
were lifted the world would end up at X  instead of Z. 
This may seem to be an extremely casual and oversimplified way to think 
about the future of the dollar.  Oversimplified  it certainly is; we would very 
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to be  if  anything  more formal and less casual than  most  discussion of  the 
international  monetary  system  and  monetary  reform.  And  this  analysis 
points  to  a  useful  way  of  framing  the ,question  of  the  future  role  of  the 
dollar:  namely, is the  fundamental  position  of  the  dollar  strong enough to 
sustain its world role? 
8.6.2 Is America Big Enough? 
The question  of  whether  the  role of  the dollar in  sustainable should, in 
principle,  be answered with a quantitative model. Unfortunately,  this is not 
feasible.  What we  can do is to compare  the position  of  the  United  States 
with that of the United Kingdom before the First World War, when sterling 
was the international currency to a much  greater extent than the dollar has 
ever been.  To  the  extent that  the  United  States  position  is  as  strong  or 
stronger,  the  continuation  of  a dollar-based  international  monetary  system 
looks possible. 
Table 8.4 presents  some comparisons between  the position  of the  United 
States in recent years and that of the  United  Kingdom at the  peak  of  ster- 
ling’s preeminence.  The United  Kingdom was the  largest trading nation  in 
1913, by a small margin  which was however bigger than the United  States 
margin  in  the  late  1970s. The  United  Kingdom  domestic  economy  was, 
however, proportionately far smaller. Also, the relatively large share of Ger- 
many  in  trade reflects  its  geographical  position  in  Europe; outside  Europe 
the United States still has a pronounced lead. 
On  the basis of  these comparisons, then, there does not  seem to be  any 
reason why  the dollar cannot continue to be the basic  international money; 
indeed, why it could not expand its role to something like that of  sterling at 
its  peak.  There  are,  however,  two  features  of  the  world  which  have 
changed-a  less important one and a crucial one. 
The less important aspect of the world which has changed is the increased 
Table 8.4  Pax Brittanica vs. Pax Americana 
United Kingdom  United States 
1913  Late  1970s 
(a)  Share of world trade 
(b) Share of world output 
(c)  Trade share of largest rival 
(d)  Output share of largest rival 
16“  12.1‘ 
14’  24.3d 
I 2”  1  I .5‘ 
(Germany)  (Gemany) 
36’  10.  I” 
(US)  (Japan) 
“Exports plus imports,  from Rostow (1978). 
bIndustrial production,  from Rostow (1978). 
‘1979  export figures, from Report  of the President on US Competitiveness, 1980 
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relative importance of trade in manufactures as opposed to primary products. 
In McKinnon’s terms, world trade has shifted from tradables 11  to tradables 
I. This in itself reduces the role of  the center country’s currency, since that 
currency is more likely to be used  for the denomination and settlement of 
trade contracts in tradables 11  than tradables I. 
The crucial difference is,  of  course,  the advent of  generalized floating 
with no end in sight. This creates incentives for diversification which reduce 
the usefulness of  the dollar as a store of value. Perhaps this will be enough 
to tip the balance.  If  so, the dollar’s role will  unravel, not because of  the 
relative decline of  the United States, but essentially because of  the general 
problem of controlling inflation. 
8.6.3 After the Fall 
What would happen if the dollar’s role were to decline sharply? There are 
really two questions here. The first is one of  the transition; would a decline 
in the dollar’s role as a store of value, in particular, amount to a devastating 
run  on the bank? Second, once the transition is  accomplished, how  much 
harm would the dethroning of the dollar do the world economy? 
The important point to notice in discussing the transition is that the prob- 
lem  is not  one of  the United States having given  the world paper in  ex- 
change for real goods and services. Very little of  the  “dollar”  holding of 
the world  is  backed  up by  high-powered money; essentially it  consists of 
short-term securities and bank deposits, many of the latter outside the United 
States. In  principle, then,  a change in the desired currency composition of 
liquid assets could be  accommodated without any redistribution of  wealth. 
Banks could convert their depositors’ Eurodollar deposits into Euromark or 
European deposits at the current exchange rate; the Federal Reserve could 
buy up Treasury bills while selling mark-denominated securities. The cur- 
rency transformation need not involve capital gains and losses to anyone. 
Where the problem would arise is in the increased exposure of  financial 
intermediaries to exchange risk.  International banks borrow short and lend 
long,  both  at present mostly  in  dollars.  A shift away from dollars would 
force a transition period during which the short borrowing and long lending 
are not  in  the same currency,  posing obvious risks to the stability of  the 
financial system.  The example of  Britain shows that  the transition can be 
made-indeed,  the unraveling of  the pound as an  international money went 
along with continuing growth of  London as a financial center. But it would 
not be a good idea to be too complacent. 
What about the long-run costs? Replacing the dollar in all its roles, with, 
say,  the  mark  would  not  seem to  make  much  difference.  A more  likely 
outcome, however, is a multipolar system with the dollar, mark, and yen all 
playing some role as international money. The cost would be a loss of econ- 
omies of  scale. Transactions costs in the interbank market would be higher, 
as would the operating costs of  international banks-but  these costs are so 278  Paul Krugman 
low at present than even a huge proportionate increase would still be a small 
number. More important, perhaps, would be the increased difficulty of  cal- 
culation in a world without a single international unit of account. But surely 
the use of three currencies to quote raw materials prices would be a far less 
important cost than  what  we  have  already experienced from  inflation and 
floating exchange rates. 
The moral, then,  seems to be that it is not  a collapsed but a collapsing 
role of  the dollar that we  should worry about. 
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